How China's Politics of Control Shape the Debate on Deserts - New York Times
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There are several “conserve the grasslands” programs that use degradation and desertification — assessment methods not mentioned — to remove rural residents, particularly herders, from the land. For example, the “retire livestock and restore grassland’’ program is also referred to as the “herder settlement’’ program. These are initiated by the central government and implemented to benefit local cadres. They cover much of northern China — Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Ningxia. Perhaps part of Shaanxi and Shanxi, but I have not been there.
To an outsider it looks like ethnic resettlement. Indeed, environmental debates are easy to manipulate. It appears to be intentional state-directed ethnic control. The Han [the dominant ethnic group in China] are farmers. Mao moved millions into the region. The Mongols are herders who will not be able to continue their traditional livelihood under present conditions.
A second factor is mining that consumes much water — I have been told up to 80 percent in Inner Mongolia, though cannot independently verify — and land. Thus environmental claims help clear the land of people. Herders are told “no goats” because of the degradation they cause, only to be removed for vast coal fields to be developed. Fly into Xilinhot. See the movie “Behemoth.’’
All is controlled by officials, all follow the same script, cite the same numbers, usually 78 to 85 percent desertified. Never mentioned are the roles of agriculture, mining, development, lack of water policy, etc.
What have you observed of anti-desertification efforts in Minqin, the town on the western end of the Tengger Desert that is under threat of being swallowed by a merger of the Tengger and the Badain Jaran deserts?
Why is Minqin County, with 115 millimeters of annual precipitation, being farmed? Why do crop failure, abandoned fields and dust storms surprise the government? One hundred fifteen millimeters is not enough for crops to grow. Parts of the Sahara have more precipitation. It is totally unsuited to farming.
I have never heard a government official take responsibility for any policy impact or failure. Minqin officials assign crops, including wine grapes and tomatoes at the edge of Tengger sand dunes, but the local farmers bear the economic risk. The motivation is perceived high profit for officials. The sad scene turns a desert into a wasteland.
Visiting the Minqin anti-desertification center is eye-opening, as scientists water vegetation to see what grows best — not a real-world situation. They speak of great advances in turning back the desert, but it is make-believe. One tactic is planting plastic shrubs, calling them trees and saying they stop the dust.
The apparent idea is that the shrubs will reduce wind speed and the uptake of soil and thus dust. It does not create any biomass or contribute to long-term improvement. Indeed, as the soil blows away, one day the shrubs will too. In China, it is the final number or answer that counts. If shrubs look like ground cover, perhaps it suits bureaucratic purposes.
I remember a farmer in Minqin talking about how they “volunteered” for weekend planting of a few of 56 billion trees. As they had no choice, they planted the seedlings upside down. In academia, it is called “weapons of the weak.” Here, it is probably born of great frustration. As they cannot protest in any way, they do small measures of resistance.
The officials saw the roots, thought they were branches and were happy. Of course these did not grow. Only the myth of 56 billion trees grew.
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